Chris Brinker directs this thriller based on real events starring Willem Dafoe, Amy Smart and Matt Dillon. Determined to bring down a powerful southern gang, detective Bud Carter (Dafoe) concentrates all his powers of persuasion on Jesse Weiland (Dillon), a member of the syndicate in custody for his misdeeds. Facing a lifetime in prison, Weiland agrees to become an informant for Carter, whose ultimate goal is to take down crime boss Lutin Adams (Tom Berenger). However, when the resourceful Adams learns of the plan, events escalate rapidly and the situation threatens to turn extremely nasty...

The years following the 2008 financial crisis produced a surge of political discontent with populism, conspiracism, and Far Right extremism rising across the world. Despite this timing, many of these movements coalesced around cultural issues rather than economic grievances. But if culture, and not economics, is the primary driver of political discontent, why did these developments emerge after a financial collapse, a pattern that repeats throughout the history of the democratic world? Using the framework of 'Affective Political Economy', The Age of Discontent demonstrates that emotions borne of economic crises produce cultural discontent, thus enflaming conflicts over values and identities. The book uses this framework to explain the rise of populism and the radical right in the US, UK, Spain, and Brazil, and the social uprising in Chile. It argues that states must fulfill their roles as providers of social insurance and channels for citizen voices if they wish to turn back the tide of political discontent.

This book challenges the conventional wisdom that policy performance is the most important determinant of regime support. It does so by focusing on two countries where performance and support do not match. Chile is the economic envy of every country in Latin America, yet support has been surprisingly anemic. By contrast, Venezuela managed to maintain extremely high levels of support during the reign of Hugo Chavez despite severe failures of governance. Resolution of these paradoxes requires turning away from policy decisions and focusing instead on how those decisions are made. Taking inspiration from democratic theory and social psychology, this book argues that extensive opportunities for direct participation in the political process engenders in citizens strong feelings of efficacy - a sense of control over the course of politics. Rhodes-Purdy uses a mixed-methods approach to test this theory, including qualitative case studies, analysis of survey data, and experimental methods.

This book challenges the conventional wisdom that policy performance is the most important determinant of regime support. It does so by focusing on two countries where performance and support do not match. Chile is the economic envy of every country in Latin America, yet support has been surprisingly anemic. By contrast, Venezuela managed to maintain extremely high levels of support during the reign of Hugo Chavez despite severe failures of governance. Resolution of these paradoxes requires turning away from policy decisions and focusing instead on how those decisions are made. Taking inspiration from democratic theory and social psychology, this book argues that extensive opportunities for direct participation in the political process engenders in citizens strong feelings of efficacy - a sense of control over the course of politics. Rhodes-Purdy uses a mixed-methods approach to test this theory, including qualitative case studies, analysis of survey data, and experimental methods.

In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis Germany became Europe's most influential nation state. This book aims to provide a comparative assessment of how this is reflected in the country's bilateral security relationships with key global and regional partners. Prepared by an international team of scholars, it will offer unique, in-depth perspectives on the ways these evolving interactions affect the prospects for addressing recent and emerging security challenges. The fact of Germany's (re-)emergence as Europe's leading state is now undisputed, even if the implications are not. The post-2008 financial crisis, heightened conflict along Europe's eastern and southern fringes since 2014, and the populist political wave across the West have all driven stronger German engagement in international affairs. While German policy seeks to exercise "leadership from the middle" via multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union, this entails major adjustments in interactions with other states. Indeed, the future of the security order built on these institutions now hinges on the quality of Germany's key bilateral ties. With such stakes in mind, this volume offers a comparative assessment of the background, status, and prospects of a selection of the most significant cases. These investigations cover Germany's relationships with the US, Russia, UK, France and China as well as with Poland and the Balkans. The volume concludes that, though active German leadership is more necessary than ever, it remains insufficient for European or broader international security. Germany and its new partners must aim for a balanced model of cooperation that responds to both the internal and external challenges of the early twenty-first century.